Leadership in Regional and Global Politics: 
Why do Emerging Powers (Sometimes) Fail to Reach Their Goals? 

Stefan A. Schirm

Paper prepared for the Workshop “The Rise of (New) Regional Powers in Global and 
Regional Politics”, German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, 
December 11.-12., 2006
Leadership in Regional and Global Politics: 
Why do Emerging Powers (Sometimes) Fail to Reach Their Goals? 

Stefan A. Schirm

1. Introduction

In the last years, policy makers, the media and academic research have been increasingly pointing to a new role of emerging countries in the world economy and in global governance. Countries such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa have been assigned a greater influence in economic as well as political matters in their regions and in world politics. Often labelled as ‘regional powers’, ‘middle powers’ and ‘emerging powers’, these countries are today widely perceived as pivotal states in international relations (Hurrell 2006; Nolte 2006). The reasons for the assignment of increased power to these states are their demographic and geographic size, their economic and military capacities and their political aspirations: All countries discussed under the rubric of emerging or regional powers dominate their neighbors in terms of ‘power over resources’, this is, population, territory, military capacity and gross domestic product. In addition, they have been increasingly articulating their willingness to lead in regional as well as global governance in the last years.

This growing ‘voice’ became visible for instance with Indias, Brazils and South Africas bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as in these countries’ leading role in the founding of the G 20 at the Cancún meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The G 20 spoke for many developing countries in confronting the industrialized world and in letting the Cancún talks fail. Thus, emerging countries are increasingly seen as the “new influentials” (Lima/Hirst 2006: 27) in ever more multipolar world politics and as countries challenging the leading role of the industrialized countries, especially of the US in shaping international relations. Some observers frame this new challenge in terms of a new North-South-Conflict and see a rising antagonism between the industrialized world and the developing world led by the newly emerging powers (Decker 2003, Hurrell/Narlikar 2005). While articulating new ‘voice’ and showing increased activities at the global level, emerging powers also tried to lead neighboring countries in efforts at enhanced regional integration. Brazil sees the Mercosur as its regional power base, engineered new initiatives such as the South American Community of Nations (CSN) and engaged in opposing the US proposal for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). South Africa and India undertook more modest, but equally leading attempts at (re-) vitalizing cooperation in their regions (Schoeman 2000; …)
However, the performance of emerging powers shows a considerable gap between their aspirations and the ability to reach their goals: For example, Brazil and India did not succeed with their aim to reach a permanent seat in the UNSC despite a well organized campaign and worldwide diplomatic activities together with Japan and Germany, which also strived for a permanent seat in the UNSC. The G 20 did not reach a liberalization of industrialized countries markets for agricultural products despite confrontational negotiating strategies at the WTO meeting in Cancún 2003 and a more cooperative stance at the meeting in Geneva in 2004 (Schirm 2005). Regional cooperation led by emerging countries such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) seem to stagnate despite being postulated as the regional power base for an enhanced participation in global politics by Brazil. Thus, the core question addressed in this paper is: What are the conditions for success and failure of emerging power leadership? Why do emerging powers (partially) fail to reach their goals?

2. Research on Emerging Powers

The new activism of emerging powers in world politics has been widely analyzed in form of case studies on individual countries as well as in case studies comparing several of these countries (for example Hurrell 2006, Hurrell/Narlikar 2005, Harris 2005, Lima/Hirst 2006, Hakim 2004, ….). These studies examine the driving forces behind the new impetus in these countries foreign and foreign economic policies as well as their activities, but do not convince in explaining the reasons for the ambivalent performance and for a failure to achieve the goals pursued. While the ideas and interests behind the claim for power such as a more ‘just’ international distribution of power and wealth as well as the wish for better access to industrialized countries’ markets have been examined (Schirm 2005, ….), the gap between the aspiration for power and actual ‘power over outcomes’ (Russett 1985: 208ff) has not been explored sufficiently yet. Hence, research lacks a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for failure and success of emerging countries strategies. A short assessment of the three – intuitively most compelling – arguments to be found in the literature highlights the need for further research on this question:

First, the lack of success of emerging powers aspirations is sometimes attributed to the resistance of the industrialized countries, especially of the US. The latter would exercise their superior power in order to secure the status quo in the international distribuion of power, from which they benefit. According to this neo-realist argument, emerging countries challenge the distribution of power, which is seen as a zero-sum game and in which gains in power by one country lead to a loss of power by another country. Interestingly, a first glance at the evidence shows, that the United States and Europe actually welcomed Brazils, South Africas and Indias aspirations in ‘words’ (public statements1) and sometimes even in ‘deeds’ such as the US-India Nuclear agreement, the inclusion of Brasil and India in the G 5 WTO

---

1 See e.g. the statement by USTR Robert Zoellick in section 4.1. and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledging that Brazil is on the way to becoming a world power (in: Glüsing 2005: 127).
preparatory group 2004, the invitation of emerging powers to G 8 summits. Also, industrialized countries declared special support to emerging countries’ role as regional stabilizers and strategic partners in their regions. Another instance for a possible exaggeration of great power contribution to emerging power failures is that the field most detached from great power influence – regional cooperation – also belongs to the examples for a considerable gap between emerging countries’ aspirations and their ability to achieve ‘power over outcomes’. Deepening and stabilizing regional cooperation is among the weak positions on the emerging powers’ performance balance (sheet for example in the case of Mercosur, see 4.3.). Thus, the neo-realist power-play argument seems not to convince fully.

Second, neo-marxist and neo-gramscian publications often argue that emerging countries would “build a bulwark” against neo-liberal “imperialism” (Harris 2005: 7) and would fight against a hegemonic project of the industrialized countries, which in turn would try to prevent emerging countries from gaining power. This argument is somehow odd, not only because industrialized countries seem to welcome an enhanced role of regional powers (see above), but also because Brazilian, Indian and Chinese elites – which shape these countries’ international relations – certainly belong to those groups, which widely benefit from “neo-liberal imperialism” and would therefore operate against their own interest in “fighting” the predominant system. Thus, there is an inherent contradiction in neo-marxist arguments because emerging countries’ elites are on the one side hailed for their resistance against the industrialized countries, but at the same time criticized for being the agents of hegemonic capitalism (‘centers’) in their countries (‘periphery’) (Cox; Wallerstein).

Third, the problems of emerging countries to achieve their goals is sometimes attributed to the internationally prevailing institutions, which would shape a structural impediment for further emergence because they reflect the prevailing international structures and ideologies. This institutionalist argument is expressed by emerging power politicians (e.g. Amorim 2003) especially with regard to the WTO and the UN (…). The principal drawback of this reasoning is that the WTO and the UN General Assembly operate with a ‘one country – one vote’ procedure leading to vast majority of developing countries. Thus, if Brazil, India and China would agree and convince the majority of developing countries, decisions against the industrialized countries would not suffer under institutional impediments. An exception is the UNSC, where industrialized countries possess veto power. But Brazil and India also failed to reach a majority for their aspirations in the UN General Assembly.

Because these three arguments do not convince fully, the explanation for emerging power weaknesses in leadership must predominantly lay with other factors. The underlying question behind the reasons for emerging countries’ performance is the question on the basic conditions for leadership in international relations. It is widely acknowledged that successful leadership depends on relevant resources, on ambition and on overcoming resistance (Nolte 2006, Pedersen 2002, ) (…). In this regard I argue that research on emerging powers has been
focussing too much on the material resources and capabilities such as GNP, territory and population and too much on the activism of emerging countries as well as on industrialized countries’ — especially US — reactions. I argue in this paper that it is essentially the lack of support by neighboring countries which precluded emerging powers from a successful pursuit of their goals in several instances. In order to perform successfully, any leadership has to be accepted by followers, in this case especially by the neighboring countries, which have to sign up to the lead of emerging powers in order to give them the power base necessary for regional as well as global power projection and international coalition building.

3. Analytical Framework

In order to proceed deductively and test the hypothesis that emerging powers’ failures are caused predominantly by a lack of support and acceptance by their neighbors it is necessary to conceptualize possible forms of and reasons for this lack of support. In the following I will therefore develop on three specific hypotheses and suggest indicators for the acceptability of emerging power leadership by their neighbors based on the premise that emerging powers can not coerce their neighbors’ support and therefore need acceptance for their leadership. The hypotheses are supposed to methodologically link an abstract and theoretically guided reasoning on leadership to empirically measurable or at least plausible indicators for the specific cases to be studied in section 4. of this paper:

- First, in order to be accepted, leadership has to be based on credible and trustworthy politics, which are benevolent in the form of leadership. This implies that the politics pursued by a potential ‘leader’ have to show a high degree of commitment and continuity in order to qualify for lasting and durable cooperation and coalition building. Neighboring countries’ perception can be an adequate indicator for this hypothesis. Another crucial indicator is the degree to which leading powers commit themselves to international and regional institutions and hereby durably and credibly embed their actions into multilateral rules. Benign leadership would then be “organized around more reciprocal, consensual, and institutionalized relations. The order is still organized around asymmetrical power relations, but the most overtly malign character of domination is muted” (Ikenberry 2001: 28). A capacity of self-restraint and for “power sharing vis-à-vis smaller states in a region” is also crucial for leadership (Pedersen 2002: 684).

- Second, as coersive power is not considered here, the strategies of the leading country must also be benevolent in substance, this is, include and consider the specific interests and goals pursued by neighboring countries. This means that emerging powers have to offer material as well as political-ideational incentives (advantages) to potential followers which are perceived as superior to the option of not following or of following other ‘leaders’. A consequence of the latter would be that neighboring
countries reject or withdraw from emerging powers’ initiatives by not cooperating or cooperating with other countries such as the industrialized countries and especially the US. The material conditions for leadership reach from the ability and willingness to offer efficient protection from security challenges over the provision of development assistance to economic advantages such as the access of neighboring countries to attractive domestic markets and investment in neighbouring countries. Also, as the literature on hegemonic stability argues, benevolent hegemons must be able to accept a certain degree of free-riding by the followers in order to secure the cooperative system (Kindleberger 1981: 247). (…)

Third, leading powers should constitute **role models** in political, economic and security matters in order to be accepted by others, especially by immediate neighbors. With this hypothesis I refer to the domestic politics of a potential leader and argue that it will only reach lasting acceptance, if it is able to organize its domestic economic development, its political system and internal security in a way that finds approval by neighboring countries: If a country is not able to be successful economically and politically internally, why should it do better in organizing regional or even global political and economic development? This hypothesis also points at the competitive situation in which emerging powers find themselves vis-à-vis the industrialized countries as leadership options for ‘followers’. Because neighboring countries will often have the opportunity of choosing between cooperation with emerging powers and for example the US and the EU (or do both), emerging powers will have to make a plausible case that they can offer a leadership project superior to possibly available alternatives also with regard to their ideational and managerial competences, assessed by looking at their domestic politics.

### Conditions for Emerging Countries’ Leadership Acceptance by Neighboring Countries

| Benevolence in form | - trustworthiness: continuity of foreign (economic) policy and cooperation  
|                     | - credibility: actions conform to proclaimed policy goals  
|                     | - commitment to multilateral institution building (reciprocity, consensus) |
| Benevolence in substance | - inclusion of economic interests of neighbors in leadership project  
|                         | - provision of economic advantages (market access, investment, aid)  
|                         | - provision of security advantages  |
| Role model/ shared beliefs | - domestic economic development seen as exemplary by neighbors  
|                          | - domestic political system seen as exemplary by neighbors  
|                          | - domestic security situation seen as exemplary by neighbors  |

> Conditions must be perceived as superior to alternative leadership offers e.g. by US/EU  
> No spill-over or compensation effects between conditions: all three must be fulfilled

For the purpose of this first draft of the paper I will exemplify the ‘benevolence in form’ and the ‘benevolence in substance’ hypotheses in the following. Further research is necessary for testing the hypotheses systematically. Suggestions for a further operationalization of the hypotheses and for specific empirical indicators are welcome as well as comments by country experts on the simplified sketch of individual countries’ performance. The exemplification in the case studies encompasses three issue areas and three emerging powers. Brazil, India and South Africa’s performance will be briefly analyzed with regard to the WTO, the UNSC and regional integration in order to illustrate the explanatory potential of the hypotheses.

4.1. Emerging Powers Performance in WTO Negotiations

The recent trade negotiations within the framework of the Doha-Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide an example for emerging countries’ increased activities. At the WTO meeting in Cancún in 2003, Brazil, India, South Africa and China led a group of initially 20 developing and newly industrializing countries, the ‘G 20’. In the name of the G 20 the emerging powers pursued a confrontational strategy towards the industrialized countries, especially the US and the EU. In substance, the articulated demands centered on

1. the desire for a “more equitable” international order and for changing the “autocratic international trade system” (Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim 2003),
2. a better access to the market for agricultural products of the EU and the US, and
3. avoiding concessions on the Singapore Issues (intellectual property rights etc.) and on liberalizing their markets for industrialized goods and services.

The G 20 insistence on their positions and the rejection of the modest EU and US concessions led to the failure of the negotiations in Cancún.

This success in terms of showing leadership in global politics was based on ‘benevolence in form’: actions showed continuity and conformed to proclaimed policy goals especially in the case of Brazil, which traditionally criticizes the asymmetrical international distribution of power and wants the industrialized countries to liberalize on agriculture, while being reluctant to liberalize itself on industry and services. ‘Benevolence in substance’ in form of including the interests of ‘followers’ was achieved by focusing on the widespread dissatisfaction with the industrialized countries’ unwillingness to liberalize agriculture and by staying rather vague on specific positions towards own tariffs, subsidies, non-tariff barriers etc. The ‘role model’ variable is difficult to assess with regard to the global reach of the G 20, because immediate neighbours seemed not to matter as much as in regional politics.

---

2 Due to its more complex operationalization, the ‘role model’ hypothesis will be left for further research.
3 “Trade must be a tool not only to create wealth but also to distribute it in a more equitable way” (Amorim 2003).
During the WTO meetings in Geneva in 2004 and Hong Kong in 2005 the emerging powers which led the G 20 showed a somewhat different performance: Preceeding the Geneva meeting, Brazil and India were ‘upgraded’ in the international hierarchy and became members of the ‘G 5 preparatory group’ together with the US, the EU and Australia. Brazils and Indias stance in Geneva was more moderate and compromising than in Cancùn and the talks led to an agreement on a framework for further negotiations. Again, Brazil showed the highest profile and attributed the success of reaching a framework agreement to the influence of the G 20: „[…] the framework agreed last weekend would not have seen daylight without the active participation of the G 20“ (Amorim 2004). On the industrialized countries side, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Robert Zoellick, acknowledged Brazils leading role in the G 5 when stating: „It fits the role that Brazil plays in the world economy and trading system“ (WTO 2004: 2). Interestingly, Brazil and India ageed to the framework without obtaining substancial concessions from the EU and the US on specific trade issues. This leads to the conclusion that the ‘upgrading’ of the two countries’ status in the international hierarchy by including them into the G 5 preparatory group was the main reason for a more moderate stance at the Geneva meeting.

The meeting in Hong Kong ended without any substancial advances and clearly showed diverging interests between and among the G 20 and the emerging powers. While Brazil and partly India were still defensive on a liberalization of their markets for industrialized goods and primarily demanded a liberalization of the EU and the US agricultural markets, China partly articulated inverse positions. Hong Kong showed that the G 20 had reached a joint stand in Cancùn essentially due to the vagueness of the positions articulated. In Hong Kong, the emerging powers leading the G 20 were only partially able to provide ‘benevolence in substance’ in form of compromises, which would have allowed for joint positions of all G 20 countries in detail. The ‘benevolence in form’ necessary for emerging powers leadership acceptance may have been also jeopardized by the ‘upgrading’ of Brazil and India in the G 5 accompanied by the mismatch of many specific trade interests of G 20 countries with those of Brazil and India. In this regard, the emerging powers find themselves in a difficult position, because they do have diverging interests among themselves and as newly industrializing countries also differ in economic interests from many developing countries. Restraining the pursuit of their national goals, this is leadership by ‘benevolence in substance’, would have required a greater inclusion of the interests of potential ‘followers’ possibly up to the point of tolerating free riders. The missing acceptance (also by Mercosur partners) of Brazils aspiration for leadership within the WTO was confirmed by its failure to occupy the general secretariat of WTO with a brazilian diplomat in 2005 (see Lima/Hirst 2006: 40).
4.2. Emerging Powers Initiative for Permanent Membership in the UNSC

Prior to the negotiations on a general reform of the United Nations in 2005 Brazil and India orchestrated a diplomatic initiative together with Germany and Japan in order to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. These ‘G 4’ countries’ central claim was that the existing composition of the UNSC permanent members, the P 5 (USA, Russia, UK, France, China), would not represent the distribution of power in today’s international order and that it should reflect the economic, political and military rise of middle powers. All four countries based their aspiration for a permanent membership on the argument, that it would give the UNSC a higher representativity and legitimacy. In the end, the G 4 initiative failed and none of these countries became a permanent member of the UNSC. Interestingly, the most overt resistance came from neighboring countries: Argentina and Mexico opposed Brazil’s membership, Italy opposed Germany’s aspiration, Pakistan opposed India’s wish and several Asian countries rejected Japan as a new permanent member of the UNSC. Obviously, the ‘old’ P 5 countries were not happy with the idea of sharing their veto power with new members, but it was the General Assembly, where developing countries hold a vast majority, which did ultimately not support the G 4 to the degree necessary (qualified majority). So, why did this core diplomatic initiative of northern and southern emerging powers fail?

At the first glance, the first condition for leadership acceptance, ‘benevolence in form’, seems to have been given in all four cases: All countries of the G 4 have previously committed themselves in various aspects to a high engagement within the UN – from peacekeeping troops over substantial budgetary contributions to continuity in presenting policy initiatives within the framework of the UN. The only condition in ‘form’, which might not have been brought forward in a convincing way from the perspective of neighboring countries, was the core argument of the G 4. Obviously, the representativity and legitimacy of an enlargement of the P 5 to a P 9 would have essentially extended the veto privileges to another 4 of the 191 UN member countries, without giving the remaining 182 UN members an increased voice in the UNSC. The option of pursuing ‘regional seats’, for example a ‘South American’ and a ‘South Asian’ seat was not on the agenda of the G 4. Thus, several neighbors such as Argentina and Pakistan perceived new privileges for Brazil and India as problematic. Here, the ‘benevolence in substance’ through incorporation the security and policy interests of potential ‘followers’ was apparently not given to the degree necessary to make neighboring

---

4 The brazilian President Lula da Silva articulated this view in a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2003: „Reform of the United Nations has become an urgent task (…). The security council must be fully empowered to deal with crises and threats to peace. (…) Above all, its decisions must be seen as legitimate by the Community of Nations as a whole. Its composition – in particular as concerns permanent membership – cannot remain unaltered almost 60 years on. It can no longer ignore the changing world. More specifically, it must take into account the emergence in the international scene of developing countries. (…) Brazil believes that it has a useful contribution to make” (Lula 2003). In his State of the Union address before the brazilian congress Lula emphasized in 2005 the need for a higher “representativity and legitimacy” of the UNSC through the inclusion of new emerging powers (Lula 2005: 233).

5 A rotating regional seat in the UNSC was the position of e.g. the Organization of African Unity (OAU), see Schoeman 2000.
countries willing to support emerging power aspirations. In the case of India, lasting security problems with Pakistan also did not trigger leadership acceptance. With regard to Brazil, two causal arguments seem plausible: 1. No transfer from leadership in economic integration (Mercosur) to acceptance of leadership in security matters (UNSC) occurred or 2. Brazil’s often ambivalent commitment and continuity with regard to regional cooperation (Mercosur) made Argentina uncomfortable with the idea of ‘following’ in security matters (UNSC). In addition to the arguments outlined above, the southern powers in the G 4, Brazil and India, contributed less to the UN budget than e.g. Mexico and the Netherlands (UNO 2003). Thus, their claim for privileges was not based on greater contributions than those of some of the desired ‘followers’.

4.3. Emerging Powers Leadership in Regional Cooperation

With regard to the leadership of emerging powers in regional politics I will focus on Brazil in this first draft. Brazil’s activities on the regional scale have been vast and varied, they reach from the attempt at building a Common Market of the South (Mercosur) in South America over the political project of forming a South American Community of Nations (CSN) up to its desire for leadership in the negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).

Mercosur was founded in 1994 and encompasses the founding members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as well as Chile and Bolivia (associated) and Venezuela (new member in 2006). After initial successes in raising trade among the member states, Mercosur stagnates economically since the end of the 1990s. Today Mercosur is far away from the goal of forming a common market and resembles more a partial free trade association. This partial failure after initial successes is mainly due to the selective re-introduction of trade barriers by Argentina and Brazil in response to internal lobby pressures and to the unwillingness of especially Brazil to build binding multilateral institutions, which could have restrained unilateral ambivalences on economic integration (Gratius 2001; Preusse 2002; Schirm 2005). Brazil has been reluctant to transfer sovereignty to common rules and institutions in order to prevent restrictions on its political dominance, which it possesses due to its superior economic weight: „Brazil dwarfs the three partners, but is not rich enough to subsidize them nor willing to surrender chunks of sovereignty, as Germany has done to promote European union“ (The Economist 11.12.04: 46).

In addition, Brazil has shifted its prime goal from the initial intention to pursue economic integration for economic reasons towards the primacy of using Mercosur as political tool in order to better confront the US. This shift occurred essentially under the Lula government and led to the economically doubtful but politically interesting inclusion of Chavez’ Venezuela into the Mercosur. Brazils’ performance as an emerging power in the Mercosur is also marked by being the member with the worst record in ratifying Mercosur resolutions. In addition, Brazil was not able to reach a common position of Mercosur members towards the EU in
order to achieve the desired free trade agreement with Europe (The Economist 11.12.04: 46). On the other hand, the EU was not able to propose far reaching reductions of trade barriers on agriculture, which Brazil desired. Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay articulated distress with the Brazilian performance towards the EU. In sum, political advantages in form of successful leadership towards the EU and economic advantages in form of access to the Brazilian market remained limited and aid remained minimal. Summing up, Brazil has been weak in the ‘benevolence in form’ of leadership due to unstable continuity of foreign trade policy and missing commitment to institution building. Its has been weak in the ‘benevolence in substance’ of its leadership due to the only partial inclusion of economic interests of ‘followers’ and due to the the limited offer of economic advantages to its neighbors.

The negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas was the second major regional field for the brazilian aspiration for regional leadership. The FTAA was initiated by the United States in 1994 and negotiations were supposed to be concluded in 2005. In the last years under the Lula government Brazil has effectively obstructed a successful conclusion of the negotiations and FTAA is basically dead today (also due to a lack of support in the US). The clash between the US and Brazil in various negotiation rounds was caused by two factors: First, Brazil and the US diverged in their economic interests, Brazil demanding liberalization of the US agriculture market and the US demanding liberalization of the brazilian markets for industrialized goods and for services. Competitive and export oriented industrial sectors in Brazil apparently were not able to decisively influence the agenda of their government (Weintraub/Prado 2005: 1). Second, the confrontation between the two countries was about leadership in the region. The latter point became crucial during the Lula government and led to the failure of the project. The political dimension of the confrontation was spelt out for example by the Secretary General of Lulas foreign ministry, Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, who denounced the FTAA as an instrument to uphold the “hegemony of the industrialized countries” (Nolte/Calcagnotto 2001: 100, see also Fishlow 2004: 293). This political nationalism is supported by ‘economic nationalism’, this is, protectionist unions and entrepreneurs, who see their jobs and profits threatened by trade liberalization (Hakim 2002).

Brazils rejection of a FTAA, which would in any case be dominated by the US because of its economic weight, is not shared by several neighboring countries in Latin America. The latter often perceived the economic advantages of cooperating with the US as superior to the option of following Brazils political project. Thus, Central American countries, Mexico in NAFTA, Chile and Columbia have signed free trade agreements with the US in order to have a better access to the US market and to foreign direct investment (Fischlow 2004: 293; The Economist 18.10.03; Sangmeister 2003: 35). In the case of Chile, the potential ‘follower’ rejected Brazils offer to become a full member of Mercosur, but instead signed a treaty with the US and remained associated member of Mercosur. The countries of the Pacto Andino also did not join

---

6 A structural fund for developmental aid within Mercosur following the example of the EU was created in 2005, but only encompassed 100 million dollars (Brazil financing 70%).
the brazilian confrontation towards the US, an attitude which contributed to Venezuelas exit from the Pact. Summing up, Brazil’s leadership seems to have been partially ‘benevolent in form’ because actions conformed to proclaimed goals, but not to all potential ‘followers’ ‘benevolent in substance’, because Brazil did not offer the economic advantages (market access, investment), which cooperation with the US promised.

5. Conclusion

In this first draft I argue that the emerging powers partial failure in achieving their goals in regional and global politics is essentially due to the only partial or missing acceptance of their leadership by neighboring countries, this is by other developing or newly industrializing countries. The short empirical sketch showed that emerging countries often did not provide ‘benevolence in form’ and ‘benevolence in substance’, which were conceptualized here as conditions for leadership acceptance. With regard to India’s and Brazil’s goal to become a permanent member of the UNSC, neighbors apparently refused to accept leadership due to a lack of ‘benevolence in form’ (ambivalent commitment to multilateral institution building on a regional scale) as well as a lack of ‘benevolence in substance’ (incorporation of neighboring countries security interests into own policies, contributions to the UN budget). The result was distrust against the emerging power’s arguments for UNSC permanent membership. With regard to the WTO, the emerging powers at stake here were successful in leading the G 20 in Cancún, but thereafter were not able to prevent an erosion of the unity of the G 20. The latter might have been caused by the accomodation of Brazil and India by their ‘upgrading’ into the WTO preparatory group and by their failure to integrate heterogenous economic interests within the G 20. Thus, ‘benevolence in substance’ was probably weak from the neighboring countries perspective due to an unconvincing incorporation of economic interests and weak provision of economic advantages such as access to large markets and foreign investment.

The regional politics case focussed on Brazil and gave some hints at brazilian weaknesses in providing ‘benevolence in form’ (lack of continuity of its trade policy, weak commitment to regional institution building in Mercosur) and in providing ‘benevolence in substance’ (inclusion of economic interests of neighbors, provision of economic advantages (market access, investment) superior to the alternative leadership offers of the US). In the end, Mercosur has been stagnating economically, but instrumentalized politically, thus including elements of successful and failed leadership. With regard to the FTAA, Brazil has been abandoned by some Latin American countries preferring cooperation with the US, while being accepted as ‘leader’ by others. Brazil did achieve its goal of obstructing an integration of the Americas. This success was reached at the price of splitting the region in two parts.

Summing up, weaknesses in providing the conditions for acceptance of leadership by ‘followers’ can indeed be detected in the performance of emerging powers and can contribute to the explanation of the partial failure of emerging powers in reaching their goals.
References

Lima, Maria Regina Soares de/Hirst, Monica 2006: Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities, in: International Affairs 82/1: 21-40.


Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio 2005: Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional (State of the Union Address to the Congress), Brasilia D.F..


