Detaching “Emerging” from “Power”: Brazil and India at the WTO Mini-Ministerial in 2008

Laura Carsten

Paper prepared for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference “Politics in Hard Times: International Relations Responses to the Financial Crisis”

September 9-11, 2010
Stockholm

The term “emerging powers,” which appears with ever-greater frequency in literature concerning states like Brazil and India, implies a focus on power-based ideas like influence and autonomy as primary determinants for the foreign policy decisions of these states. This is particularly the case in their policy decisions vis-à-vis international economic institutions like the IMF or the WTO, which are often presented as bastions of institutionalized power. This paper tests this assumption in a case study of the participation of two emerging powers, Brazil and India, in the WTO ministerial meeting of the Doha Round held in Geneva in July 2008. Specifically, through discourse analysis of industry commentary and government statements and analysis of public opinion polls, the paper traces the impact of domestic economic interests and power-based ideas on national policy positions at the WTO meeting, in so doing determining the impact these domestic factors had on the failure of the talks in Geneva. Ultimately, the results of the empirical analysis suggest power-based ideas are less salient in determining the foreign policy motivations of these emerging powers vis-à-vis use of these institutions than would be expected based upon the implications of the current literature.
Detaching “Emerging” from “Power”: Brazil and India at the WTO Ministerial in 2008
Laura Carsten, August 2010

Terms like “emerging powers,” which appear with ever-greater frequency in literature concerning states like Brazil, India, Russia or China, imply a focus on power-based ideas like influence and autonomy as primary determinants for the foreign policy decisions of these states. This is particularly the case in their policy decisions vis-à-vis international economic institutions like the IMF or the WTO, which are often presented as bastions of institutionalized power. Such perceptions have been reinforced by the governments of these states through participation in events, like the BRIC Summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009 or multiple IBSA Summits, designed to emphasize the distinctiveness and strength of these states sandwiched between the industrialized and the developing worlds.

Given this emphasis on power as a motivating goal for emerging power (EP) states, analyses which accept the implicit assumption of power hierarchies in these terms often argue that foreign policy remains the preserve of political elites in these states. This argument seems obvious for autocratic (China) or pseudo-democratic (Russia) states, but less so for stable democracies like India and Brazil. Nonetheless, it persists, emphasizing policy isolation in Brazil and India through layers of corruption, bureaucratic nightmares, and institutional structures which only grant access to already a select group of domestic actors, if any at all (Two Americas 2009; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006, 417; Marconini 2009, 152-155; Sotero and Armijo 2007, 68-69; Dhar and Majumdar 2006). Elites in these “Power-Hungry EPs” orient both foreign and foreign economic policy to geopolitical purposes, attempting to maximize their international influence while minimizing limits to their autonomy of sovereign action (Veiga 2009; Nayar and Paul 2003, 11).

Other strands of literature, however, present a totally different picture. Here, descriptions of these states underline their growing economic capacity and a determination to develop this further as the states’ primary goal. In other words, economic interests are the primary determinant of these states’ foreign policies. EPs in this literature are “marked by pragmatism” (Roelofse-Campbell 2006, 16), focused on “practicable and measurable effort, rather than the global ‘talk-shop’ approach”

---

1 I am grateful to the following people for their constructive criticism and helpful advice on earlier versions of this paper: Stefan Schirm, Yuan-Juhn Chiao, Aukje van Loon, and the participants at the 2nd Annual Summer Workshop for Comparative Regionalism at the University of Bamberg, June 2010.
(Miller 2005, 52) and interested in “diverse alliances of a more pragmatic than ideological characters” (Almeida 2007, 10). Such work often argues the governments of these “Pragmatic EPs” are quite responsive to organized domestic interest groups, even when doing so may not make economic sense. Jawara and Kwa (2003), for example, trace India’s stubbornness towards the opening of the Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2001 to the 25,000 person protest against the round in New Delhi the week before the meeting in Qatar. Likewise, Rios (2006, 231) argues the restructuring of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas negotiations in 2003 represented a “race to the bottom” in terms of ambition as participating countries, and especially Brazil, decreased their ambition to avoid politically painful market concessions.

Admittedly, other strands of the literature admit both economic and power-based goals as being important for EPs, though even here the relationship between these goals is unclear. Some work argues power-based goals are tools to achieve economic ones. For example, Landsberg (2006, 4-5) claims the IBSA states seek more influence in order to better distribute the economic gains of globalization. Other work argues in the opposite direction, namely that economic goals are merely tools to achieve power-based goals. Examples here include Hurrell’s argument (2006, 18) that liberalization for EPs is simply a means of gaining power, or Ikenberry’s (2008, 5) that, as state power is “ultimately based on sustained economic growth,” China must integrate to “be a world power.” Finally, a third group sets these goals parallel to one another. Nel and Stephen (2008, 2), for example, argue EPs try to maximize economic gains from global governance as it is while simultaneously trying to influence the reform of global governance rules to better suit their national interests. As might be expected, the positions of these strands of literature regarding EP government responsiveness are a mixed bag.

All of these contrasting arguments suggest several questions that need answers to expand understanding of the EPs and their policymaking. What informs the policy decisions of EP states? And how responsive are these governments to organized interests within their borders? The purpose of this paper is to address these holes in the literature through empirical exemplification in two emerging power states, Brazil and India. The paper first explores the relationship between power-based and economic goals through analysis of these states’ participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) mini-ministerial meeting held in Geneva between July 21 and July 30, 2008. Second, it seeks to shed some light on the
responsiveness of EP governments to domestic interest groups by correlating industry group statements and public opinion polls on one hand with government commentary on the other. It should be noted that, although this paper and its conclusions only refer to two emerging powers in one field of foreign economic policy, it is hoped that the theoretical framework and results developed here will prove useful for future explorations of other EPs’ foreign economic policy behavior.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical framework and variables, and the section thereafter, the methodology to be employed. The fourth section contextualizes and gives a brief description of the proceedings in Geneva in July 2008. The fifth and sixth sections present the case studies of India and Brazil in Geneva, respectively. The final section concludes.

Theoretical Framework

Given the systemic approach which often dominates many accounts of these states and their ambitions (Drezner 2007, Nolte 2007, Evenett 2007, Ikenberry 2008, among others), this paper seeks to complement the existing literature by applying a societal approach (Schirm 2009, Moravcsik 1997). This provides an opportunity not just to test whether a different approach results in different conclusions regarding EP foreign economic policy motivations, but also picks up on suggestions in the literature to extend the concept of power beyond the traditional constraints of structural realism. As Barnett and Duvall note (2005, 41), “the failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates.” Thus examining the behavior of EP delegations from the perspective of their responsiveness to domestic interest groups and voters should shed some light on the role played by neorealist, power-based ideas versus the role played by liberal economic interests inside the political process of pluralistic states. In addition, doing so helps explore not just the differences between EPs Brazil and India – whose different economic compositions easily explain their differing stances towards the issues at hand in Geneva in 2008 – but also seeks to highlight the commonalities in policymaking processes within these states, thus fleshing more meaning into the concept of “emerging powers.”

The analysis below seeks to build a correlation between the presence of the independent variables of economic interests and power-based ideas and the dependent variable of the positions taken by the Brazilian and Indian delegations at
the mini-ministerial in Geneva. Economic interests are defined as the economic actions which, when implemented, cause benefits to accrue to various private actors as a result of state strategic decisions. Under the theoretical scope of Moravcsik’s liberal theory of international politics (1997), this definition assumes the domestic interaction of these actors’ interests will ultimately determine the state’s policy position, which is subsequently projected to the rest of the world. Given the WTO’s primary purpose is to liberalize market access through multilateral negotiation, the economic interests traced in this paper will be those thematically related to this purpose. These include market liberalization, market protection, and economic cooperation in the field of trade. Market liberalization is defined as gaining access to new markets. Market protection is preventing other states from gaining access to new markets. Finally, economic cooperation in trade is the act of cooperating to affect trade flows either positively or negatively.

Citing Parsons (2002, 48), “ideas are subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions.” Power-based ideas, on the other hand, are conceptions of the world, relationships, or actions which define sought-for interdependencies between actors. As Schirm (2009, 504) notes, such ideas are path-dependent and therefore change more slowly than do economic interests. In addition, ideas underline “core domestic social identities” (Moravcsik 2008, 240) and are made relevant to political actors by a high degree of commonality within a state (Schirm 2009, 504). Thus power-based ideas address the appropriateness of potential interdependencies for the domestic society’s perception of its own identity. Given this paper’s attempt to expand the neorealist concepts of power by incorporating insights from the liberal tradition of international relations, the two relevant power-based ideas here are autonomy and influence. Autonomy is defined as a state’s ability to pursue its goals despite limitations imposed upon it by external constraints, such as participation in governance regimes and agreements. This definition incorporates the traditional idea of autonomy, as independence from external constraints, but does not by definition exclude states participating in international institutions from seeking autonomy. Rather, governments may pursue autonomy in an issue-based way, seeking to attain some goals within institutions and others outside of it. The second power-based variable reviewed, influence, can be either direct or indirect. Direct influence represents the Dahl’s classic 1957

2 A table listing the indicators used for each economic interest and idea in the analysis can be found in Appendix I.
definition of power: “the ability of A to get B to do something B would not normally do” (Riker 1964, 342). Indirect influence, also termed indirect power, is the ability to shape the system to reflect your goals and norms (Schirm 1994, 36-38) as well as the ability to shape what others want (Nye 1990, 181).

In addition to the variables listed above, the idea of development will also be included as a control. Why include development? High levels of income inequality, widespread poverty and underdeveloped infrastructure, among other things, reinforce what Hurrell (2006, 16) calls “imperatives of economic development” in these states. Consequently, it can be logically expected that, if any idea appears in the foreign economic policy positions of these states, this idea should appear, especially in the context of a trade round entitled the Doha Development Agenda. Second, why use development as an idea rather than an economic interest? Development is certainly a major policy goal of many states and is also primarily achieved through economic actions such as building infrastructure or facilitating the creation and improvement of various sectors. It is not, however, an economic action in itself, but, rather, the goal orienting states to implement certain economic actions. In other words, development is the end and not the means, and therefore exists on a different plane from economic interests like liberalization or economic cooperation. Development is defined here as creating and maximizing gains from a stable and prosperous macroeconomic environment while minimizing social inequalities in distribution of the benefits from this process. Its inclusion is intended to test the role played by ideas versus interests in EP policymaking. Hence, should statements show that economic interests and not power-based ideas dominate government statements in the analysis, the inclusion of the idea of development will help determine whether this represents the absence of power or the absence of ideas in the policymaking process in these states.

Although the purpose of the analysis is to employ two different types of independent variables – ideas and interests – to explain a single dependent variable – EP policy positions in Geneva in 2008 – a caveat must be noted from the beginning: in addition to their relationship with the dependent variable, these independent variables can also interact with one another. Two possible relationships between the variables are possible. First, ideas and interests can reinforce one another. For example, a desire for autonomy from the WTO would support a wish for quicker market access via bilateral, rather than multilateral, trade liberalization.
Alternatively, ideas and interests may contradict one another. An example here would be a desire to visibly exert more influence at the WTO via veto power – thus blocking a deal – and a simultaneous desire for market liberalization – which such a veto would necessarily delay.

Although such interrelationships are certainly an interesting and valuable topic for further research, they will not be included in this analysis for two reasons. First, for reasons of analytical simplicity, the variables will be treated independently. This will allow clearer identification of the correlation between the relevant independent variable and the position taken by the government. Second, incorporating the role played by the relationships amongst the independent variables is unlikely to add any value to this specific analysis. The focus here is not on the outcome of the negotiations at the WTO, nor on the strategy chosen by the various governments to achieve their aims. Rather, the focus is on the relationship between the position taken by the government and the potential factors motivating it. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, ideas and interests will be employed as independent variables which are also independent of one another.

**Operationalization**

The variables outlined above will be operationalized via analysis of Brazilian and Indian participation in the WTO mini-ministerial meeting. So, why choose the WTO, and why specifically these two EP states? Regarding the use of the WTO as the empirical setting, a certain degree of selection bias is acknowledged. After all, the WTO deals with trade, suggesting that the primary importance of economic interest motivations in EP foreign policy processes is predetermined by the institutional setting. Were one to look at the reform of the United Nations Security Council, on the other hand, one might similarly expect power-based ideas to dominate EP policy motivations. Despite these common sense warnings, case studies about the WTO are expected to yield helpful insights for several reasons. First, according to several authors, economic motivations are not necessarily the primary determinants of trade policy in EPs. While some argue that trade politics in these states primarily serves the geopolitical goals of general foreign policy (Marconini 2009, 152-155; Blustein 2009, 188-190; Veiga 2009; Chaisse, Chakraborty and Nag 2008, 7), others claim stances taken at the WTO are simply posturing (Jenkins 2003, 612) and still others emphasize the role played by political personalities in search of the limelight (Dieter 2009, 13 ff.29). Thus pitting common sense against the claims in the literature via the analysis
in this paper will hopefully create some clarity regarding the real motivations of EPs in their trade policymaking, at least within the WTO. Second, described by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim as “the most evolved” of Brazil’s multilateral instruments (MRE 2008), the WTO is an appropriate forum for both Power-Hungry and Pragmatic EPs to pursue their goals. For Power-hungry EPs, the relatively equal voice opportunities provided by a consensus decision-making process are an ideal platform not just to demonstrate one’s power, but also to promote the idea of oneself as powerful through dialogue and coalition-building. For Pragmatic EPs, on the other hand, the WTO is a forum with the potential to greatly increase market access worldwide and, in so doing, positively impact the economies of these states. Finally, precisely because the WTO is an economic institution, it is important to determine what role non-economic ideas and interests play within it. In addition, the choice of the WTO, which governs trade, as opposed to, say the International Monetary Fund, which governs finance, is a good starting point since trade is “more central to [domestic] political debates” (Daunton 2010, 54) and therefore a good place to seek preliminary correlations between domestic ideas and interests on one hand and government positions on the other.

Why choose Brazil and India? First, trade plays an increasingly important role in these states’ foreign economic policies (Martinez-Diaz and Brainard 2009, 2; Varshney 2007). Further, their recent emphasis on mixed trade strategies, incorporating bilateral, regional, interregional and multilateral efforts, suggests an exploration of what factors influence why and how EPs behave in the WTO is needed. Finally, Brazil and India have been pragmatically chosen as the easiest cases within the group of states labeled as emerging powers in which to test government responsiveness to domestic lobbying. This is not only because of the democratic nature of their governments, which implies at least a minimum of responsiveness to voter preferences, but also a result of the well-developed civil societies and strong communication infrastructure in these states, which ensure higher levels of industry and voter participation and facilitate access to data in the form of statements and polls.

The case studies will undertake a discourse analysis of statements of two types of actors, industry group representatives and elected or appointed public officials. Industry group discourse will be examined as the source of domestic
economic interests, while government statement will be examined to determine government positions throughout the negotiations. These actors have been chosen to maximize the credibility of their statements. The standard methodological criticism of discourse analysis is also the most obvious: one can find a statement to support any given position, especially in politics. As Potter and Wetherell (1995, 48) argue, the variety in the description of a certain topic results from the different actions different participants hope to achieve through what they say. The key here is that, in both groups of actors whose discourse will be examined, the actions the actors hope to achieve are the same across each group: the government officials considered here all seek re-election (whether for themselves or for their parties) and industry groups all want their preference vis-à-vis a certain policy to become government policy. Thus, though an actor may represent a topic differently based upon his or her audience or the situation in which the actors find themselves (Fuhrman and Oehler 1986, 296), these actors are united in attaining goals which directly impact their well-being and which they will consequently pursue using the most effective means available. For this reason, other actors, such as experts, are excluded as they are neither decision-makers nor accountable to domestic actors for their positions (Schirm 2009, 507).

The case studies cover statements made between May 1 and August 30, 2008. This period includes three months of preparatory work leading up to the meeting, the duration of the meeting itself, and one month of recriminations following its failure. Statements made during the preparatory period reflect the domestic negotiation process between industry groups and the respective governments; those made during the mini-ministerial, the results of these negotiation processes inside the EPs; and those after the meeting, an evaluation of the priorities set and the positions taken during the meeting. Thus, analysis of this time frame highlights the various roles played by economic interests and power-based ideas throughout the entire process of foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the WTO mini-ministerial. Government statements are taken from the responsible ministry websites, including press releases, speeches, and press briefings by responsible government officials, as

---

3 It is acknowledged that industry groups – which are, after all, composed of voters – may have preferences regarding societal ideas in addition to their economic interests. The reverse is also true for public opinion polls and economic interests. For the purpose of analytical clarity, however, interests will be traced exclusively to interest groups and ideas to public opinion.
well as from major periodicals accessed through the LexisNexis database. Similarly, industry group statements are taken from the websites of the industry groups themselves, in the form of press releases, statements by industry group leaders, and public letters to the government, as well as from the periodicals in LexisNexis.

Since there is no type of actor which represents societal ideas in the direct way that interest groups represent interests or government actors, government positions, public opinion polls will be examined as the source of domestic ideas amongst general voters. Polls will be selected according to the following criteria. First, only nationwide polls will be used in order to maximize the accuracy of the opinions expressed in the polls as a reflection of general domestic ideas. Second, unlike the discourse analysis, polls used were generated not in the months but rather the years surrounding the mini-ministerial. This decision is justified both theoretically – domestic ideas change slowly – and practically – since finding polls related to the relevant power-based ideas in the few months leading up to the mini-ministerial was not always possible. Finally, only polls from respected polling organizations, both domestically and internationally, will be included.

**WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting, July 21-July 30, 2008: Contextualization in the DDA**

The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of trade negotiations - the first of its kind under the scope of the WTO - started in November 2001. Negotiations have been marked by confrontation between so-called Northern and Southern states, with the primary fight centering on developing countries’ refusal to open non-agricultural markets and industrialized states’ refusal to open their agricultural markets. The Round, which was planned to conclude by December 2005, passed that deadline having failed to reach an agreement. In July 2006, it was suspended by WTO Director General (DG) Pascal Lamy, but resumed half a year later and proceeded in baby steps toward the mini-ministerial meeting in July 2008 in Geneva.

The mini-ministerial itself brought together ministers from roughly 40 countries on July 21, 2008 for meetings intended to start resolving remaining issues and to outline the next steps for the Round. Issues included agreeing upon modalities for agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), as well as concluding discussion of services and rules (WTO 2010, The July 2008 Package). On Wednesday, July 23, the meetings moved from the Green Room and the Trade

---

4 The responsible ministries are the Department of Commerce and Industry (DoC) for India and the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) for Brazil. In addition, statements made by heads of government for each country are included.
Negotiations Committee to an even smaller group: the G7, comprising the United States (US), the European Union (EU), Japan, China, India, Brazil and Australia (Pomeroy and Palmer 2008). The G7, which was described by USTR Susan Schwab as “the core group of seven leading members from the developed and developing world,” was the primary negotiating group throughout the rest of the negotiations (Doha Round Talks Sways, Shows Signs of Breakdown 2008). Negotiations were in trouble by Friday, July 25, as the G7, specifically India, failed to accept the compromise text drafted by DG Lamy with the chairs of agricultural and NAMA negotiations (Blustein 2009, 267). A deal between Brazil and the US, however, in which the US agreed to lower its subsidy cap in exchange for Brazil deepening industrial tariff cuts, kept things going over the weekend (Miller 2008). Ultimately, the negotiations failed when the United States, China and India failed to agree on the appropriate trigger level for the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) proposed to protect developing country farmers from agricultural import surges (Implications of the Failure of WTO Talks 2008).

The failure of the mini-ministerial in Geneva in 2008 was heralded by many as the death of the Doha Round and by some even for the WTO itself (for example, The Doha Round…and Round…and Round 2008). Work, however, has continued. The Seventh Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva in late 2009 to discuss “The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment”, but produced no significant progress. As DG Lamy noted in a speech to the Trade Negotiations Committee on June 11, 2010:

There is no other way to get to the result we all want than by consistent hard work for as long as it takes. […] If there is one thing which remains crystal clear in all of our minds it is that we cannot, I repeat, cannot have an ambitious result without overall balance. Such is our challenge — to aim for high ambition while ensuring balance (WTO 2010a).

India at the Mini-Ministerial

The Indian negotiating team, and especially its leader, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, played a visible role throughout the negotiations and were vocal about India’s goals in participating in the talks. Data gathered from government statements and media coverage of the negotiations revealed five sectors expected to be affected, positively or negatively, by the final WTO deal: agriculture, automobiles and automobile components, textiles, gems and jewelry, as well as IT-BPO services. In addition to statements from the respective industry and agriculture associations,
statements from the apex agriculture and industry bodies, which represent multiple sectors, were included, given the broad scope of the Doha negotiations.\textsuperscript{5} For India, these are the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the agricultural Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham). As stated above, interest group discourse will be examined as a source of government preferences regarding economic interests while public opinion surveys will be consulted to determine the positions of the average voter regarding the ideas under consideration here.

Economic interests are present in 58.3\% of the industry and agriculture association discourse reviewed, or 35 of the 60 total statements. Specifically, of the economic interests traced, protectionist positions represented the largest percentage (40.0\%), with liberalization appearing about half as frequently (18.3\%). Specific calls for cooperation were absent. Industry fears in the protectionist statements varied, ranging from worries about job loss to a loss of investment to increased competition from cheaper imports resulting from lower tariffs - all of which were expected to unduly impact the livelihood and even the existence of the industries. Statements evidencing liberalization, on the other hand, indicated the hope by industry groups that an eventual Doha deal would result in market access gains via the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Examples of industry group statements, beside the corresponding government statements, can be found in Table 1 below.

What of government statements? The variables discovered in government statements follow closely those found in industry group statements. Regarding economic interests, Indian government statements, like those from the industry groups, evidenced the dominance of protection, which appeared in 24.2\% of the 91 total statements compared to liberalization in 16.5\% and economic cooperation in 2.2\%. Protectionist statements focused on protecting infant industries and sensitive sectors as well as individual farmers and businesses, while liberalization statements were clear calls for increased market access. Statements emphasizing cooperation focused on the benefits of global integration. In other words, as is evident in the examples in Table 1 below, government statements regarding economic interests correlated closely with statements made by interest groups throughout the

\textsuperscript{5} A complete list of Brazilian and Indian industry groups examined can be found in Appendix II.
negotiation process, suggesting a seemingly high degree of government responsiveness to domestic pressure where economic interests are concerned.

**TABLE 1: INDIA: Industry Group and Government Statements, July 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Interest</th>
<th>Industry Group</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Assocham President Sajjan Jinda: “The so-called anti-concentration clause is a clear ploy to maim sensitivities of developing countries which are primarily premised on livelihood concerns” (Industry Chambers Write to WTO DG, Convey Concern over NAMA 2008).</td>
<td>Kamal Nath, Indian Minister of Trade and Commerce: “We are not at all happy about the SSM proposal. All manner of objections are being raised to our right to safeguard livelihood concerns of hundreds of millions. Are we expected to stand by, see a surge in imports and do nothing? Do we give developed countries the unfettered right to continue subsidizing &amp; then dumping those subsidies on us jeopardizing lives of billions?” (DoC 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FICCI Secretary-General Amit Mitra, on his pride about India’s stance toward the special safeguard mechanism (SSM): “This mechanism is protecting our farmers from any surge of artificially cheap and subsidised imports from developed countries” (India Inc Supports Gov’t Tough Stand at WTO Talks 2008).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>FICCI Secretary General Amit Mitra said, “Indian business is relying on the services negotiations to have effective market access in the areas of professional and other business services in developed countries” (FICCI Seeks Market Access for Indian Service-Providers at WTO 2008)</td>
<td>Minister Nath: “In addition, we also need to tackle market access barriers in developed countries due to high tariffs and other restrictions” (DoC 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the domestic source of government ideas, public opinion surveys showed the relative importance of the ideas influence and development in the general voting population in the time period surrounding the mini-ministerial. Regarding power-based ideas, a survey from September 2007 showed not only that Indians surveyed rated India as having more influence over world affairs of any country except the United States (US), but also that those surveyed both expected that influence to increase in the next ten years, and that they thought it should (Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) 2006, 30-31). In addition, the same survey noted that 56% of those surveyed thought it best for India to take a more active part in global affairs, versus 31% in favor of increased isolation (22-23). Thus it appears voters strongly supported influence-based engagement abroad in the time leading up to the mini-ministerial. Autonomy appeared less important in the opinion polls reviewed. For example, a joint study by the CCGA and WorldPublicOpinion.org revealed that only 29% of those surveyed supported India
failing to comply with an unfavorable WTO ruling, compared to 37% who thought India should comply regardless of the nature of the ruling (2006, 8). In addition, a different survey finds that Indians ranked the WTO more favorably than any other international organization reviewed (CCGA 2006, 28). In other words, it appears that not autonomy but its opposite – institutional affiliation – was important to general voters in the given time period. Finally, the control idea, development, appears to have garnered strong support from Indian voters. In a survey by Bertelsmann in October 2007, 73% of Indians surveyed ranked poverty reduction as an important goal for world powers to pursue – more than any other goal considered in the survey (Bertelsmann 2007, 29-30). Similarly, 80% of Indians surveyed by CCGA in September 2006 considered combating hunger an important goal for Indian policymakers (8). In sum, then, while the power-based idea of influence and the control variable of development both appeared to have a strong presence in domestic society in the run-up to the mini-ministerial, a wish for autonomy from the institutional restrictions imposed by the WTO itself was mostly absent.

Similar to these polls, the dominant ideas in government statements throughout the negotiation process were influence and development. Specifically, government statements evidencing the presence of the power-based idea of influence indicate the government wanted their preferences heard and implemented; in other words, these were calls to increase India’s indirect influence in the WTO. For example, Minister Nath argued prior to the meeting:

We had asked for a revised text before the Ministerial Meeting. We were not alone in this. This call has not been heeded. This issue has to be discussed in the Ministerial Meeting leading to a clear decision as an integral part of the outcome (DoC 2008). This suggests the government was committed to multilateral trade liberalization as a process and the WTO as an institution, which in turn reflects the findings in the opinion polls above related to the idea of autonomy or, rather, its reverse, affiliation. Finally, government statements including the idea of development represented a mix of calls for general development, for special and differential treatment and, most prominently, demands to abide by the development mandate of Doha. For example, Minister Nath said in a statement: “The focus of World Trade Organization talks should be to reduce poverty in the world and not just to increase the prosperity of the wealthy nations” (WTO Should Promote Equity: Kamal Nath 2008). Such statements, and especially their focus on minimizing distributional problems like poverty, correlate closely to the ideas evidenced in domestic opinion polls prior to
the meeting. Thus, as with economic interests above, the evidence suggests a relatively high degree of government responsiveness to domestic pressure where ideas are concerned.

However, it should be noted that the degree of correspondence between government ideas and their domestic sources varies based upon the type of idea under review. Although the power-based ideas present in government statements do correspond to opinion poll findings, their presence in government statements is less pronounced than one may expect from the polls. For example, despite broad support for initiatives to increase Indian influence in the world, influence appears in only 2.2% of the government statements. The control idea of development on the other hand seems to correlate to a more predictable degree, being both prioritized as an important policy goal by Indian voters in the polls and the second-most present variable in the analysis of government statements (26.4% after economic interests at 42.9%). How can this be explained? The large gap between the perceived importance of power-based ideas amongst voters and these ideas’ appearance in government statements suggests perhaps both camps in the literature regarding the domestic responsiveness of EP governments are partially correct: while the Indian government in this case proved itself willing to respond to ideational pressure, they were more willing to respond to domestic ideas outside the preserve of traditional, elite policymaking structures. In other words, perhaps when it comes to power-based ideas, which connect more directly to foreign policy as a whole and are less tangible and therefore less likely to affect voting behavior, EP governments take their direction from voters but determine the weight of such ideas within policy based upon other criteria. Such a conclusion would support other research on the weight of ideas versus interests in foreign economic policy behavior (Schirm 2009) while expanding the concepts developed there to determine the weight of different ideas within policymaking processes.

As to the distribution of the variables within government commentary, the discourse analysis shows an overwhelming dominance of economic interests over power-based ideas. Specifically, as can be seen in Table 2, which summarizes the results from the discourse analysis, whereas economic interests appeared in 42.9% of the statements reviewed, power-based ideas were present in only 2.2%. Put differently, economic interests were roughly twenty times more present in government statements than were power-based ideas. In addition, the idea of
development demonstrated a significant presence in government statements at 26.4%, or roughly twelve times more present than the power-based ideas traced. In other words, discourse analysis of government commentary surrounding India’s participation in the mini-ministerial meeting of the WTO in Geneva in July 2008 indicates very little support for the argument that EP states are motivated primarily by power-seeking. India appears to be the Pragmatic EP, not the Power-hungry EP, in this case of foreign economic policymaking.

### Table 2: INDIA: WTO Mini-Ministerial Negotiations, Geneva, July 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC INTEREST</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWER-BASED IDEAS</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER IDEAS</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCLASSIFIABLE</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commentary on Negotiations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT TOTALS</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, then, this case study provides clear answers to both of the questions examined in this paper. Regarding the question of policy motivation, Indian policy positions at the mini-ministerial appear to have been primarily informed by economic interests, not power-based ideas. Additionally, the significant presence of the idea of development in government discourse affirms the existence of a role for ideas generally in affecting foreign economic policy positions. Regarding the question of domestic responsiveness, on the other hand, the Indian government proved quite responsive to both domestic ideas and interests, though to a different extent for each. While domestic interests appeared to set both the direction and weight given to economic interests within government positions in Geneva (as is evidenced in Table 2 above), government responsiveness to ideas was less consistent. Although all ideas examined correlated with the direction of the stated government positions, other, unidentified factors appear to have mediated regarding how important a role these ideas played within government positions. This would be an interesting topic for further research.
Brazil at the Mini-Ministerial

The Brazilian negotiating team, headed by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, like the Indian team, was vocal in presenting and defending Brazil’s interests at the meeting in Geneva. Government sources as well as press coverage of the mini-ministerial suggested a number of sectors within Brazil which seemed most likely to be affected, positively or negatively, by the potential Doha deal. These included ethanol, sugar and sugarcane, poultry, automobile, electronics and agriculture. Thus the industry and agricultural associations for these sectors were consulted for commentary.6 As in the case study above, given the scope of the negotiations and to control for the inclusion of both pro-liberalization and pro-protection sectors, statements from four apex groups - the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo (FIESP), the Brazilian Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA), and the Brazilian Foreign Trade Association (AEB) - were also reviewed as potential sources of government economic interest positions. Also as before, relevant public opinion polls were consulted as potential sources for Brazilian government ideas.

Economic interests appeared in 65% of the Brazilian industry commentary reviewed. Specifically, and in contrast to the Indian industry commentary, liberalization was the economic interest most commonly found in the Brazilian statements, appearing in 53.8% of the 80 total statements compared to protection in only 5% of the statements and economic cooperation in 6.3%. Statements concerning liberalization mostly called for an ambitious outcome to the negotiations in terms of market access, while the few protectionist statements demanded infant industry protection. Statements supporting economic cooperation were roughly evenly divided between calls for Northern and for Southern trade partners, but all emphasized the benefits of integration in the global market and cooperation with others. A sampling of the industry statements which feature economic interests, along with their government counterparts, can be found in Table 3 below.

Government statements also presented a plurality of economic interests. Specifically, 41.2% of the 131 total government statements evidenced the presence of economic interests. The largest segment of these statements, at 34.4%, indicated the

---

6 Translations of statements examined which originally appeared in Portuguese are the result of a combination of the author’s and automatic translation resulting from numerous online translation and dictionary programs. Fluent speakers of Brazilian Portuguese were consulted to verify translations when meanings remained unclear. Thus the translations are considered accurate representations of the original language.
importance of market liberalization, versus 2.3% for protection and 5.3% for economic cooperation. Most of the liberalization statements were actually statements opposed to protection in the form of industrialized country agricultural subsidies and other distortions in the multilateral trading system which limit market access. Protectionist statements emphasized the importance of flexibilities for industry and showed reluctance to face severe tariff cuts. Finally, cooperation statements emphasized the importance of trade cooperation generally and were evenly split between an emphasis on Northern and on Southern trade partners as being important for Brazil. Thus, as is evident from the examples of industry group and government commentary in Table 3 below, government commentary concerned with economic interests corresponds closely to industry group commentary. As with India, domestic pressure related to economic interests appears to set both the direction and relative weight of these economic interests for the Brazilian government in formulating its positions vis-à-vis the issues discussed in Geneva.

**TABLE 3: BRAZIL: Industry Group and Government Statements, July 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Interest</th>
<th>Industry Group</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>August Jose de Castro, vice-president of the AEB: “The failure of Doha means that protectionism won over commercial opening, and Brazil loses with this” (Brazilian Entrepreneurs Say They Have Options Beyond the Agreement 2008).</td>
<td>President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: “It is a very great shame that the rich countries subsidize their products to export and this causes great harm to competition. In other words, when we open our mouths to speak of free trade, it has to be free indeed. It cannot be half free” (MRE 2008a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Jackson Schneider, President of the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Anfavea), evaluating the Brazilian government: “Throughout the meetings, there was a strong position respecting the limits of the industry” (Landim 2008).</td>
<td>Minister Celso Amorim said attempts “to overload” the negotiations by seeking to limit the flexibilities allowed under the formula make mandatory deeper cuts above the formula average in some sectors “is a recipe for failure” (Deep Divisions Remain as WTO Meets to Broker Breakthrough Deal 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Statement from the CNI: “The country [Brazil] is a global trader and, as such, maintaining trade relations with other countries is important” (Oliveira 2008).</td>
<td>Minister Amorim, Brazil has already accepted “a certain trade-off” among the lists of products considered sensitive and the tariff cutting rates in order to preserve the integrity of Mercosur (Fiori 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding domestic ideas, public opinion surveys show, as in the Indian case, the ideas of influence and development appear to be the most relevant ideas to Brazilian voters of those under consideration. Regarding influence, polling data did
not address influence as directly as in the Indian case. However, enough data was present to conclude the domestic importance of influence in Brazil. For example, a survey from Brazilian research institute Datafolha showed that 79% of respondents felt Brazil was “of great importance” in the world and 73% expected Brazil to become more important in the world in the future (2000, 15-16). Further, a BBC World Service Poll showed that 84% of respondents evaluated Brazil’s influence in the world as positive, versus only 10% who felt it was negative (2010, 12). Thus it appears Brazilians both expected and wanted Brazil to exert more influence in the world. The data measuring the importance of the idea of development within Brazil, on the other hand, was both present and decisive in the polls reviewed. In a poll from the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion (IBOPE), 68% of respondents indicated development issues as the main issues requiring attention from the Brazilian government, including improving education (42%), expanding social programs (15%) and economic development (11%) (2007, 70-75). Further, a poll from Bertelsmann suggests Brazilian support for development was not just limited to development at home: of the potential policy goals world powers should pursue, a plurality of respondents chose global poverty reduction as the most important goal (2007, 29-30). Thus it can be concluded that Brazilian voters generally approved of government participation in development efforts, both within Brazil and abroad, at the time of the mini-ministerial.

The power-based idea of autonomy, on the other hand, seemed to have little relevance for Brazilian voters. Although, unlike the Indian case, no poll was found which directly addressed participation or non-participation in the WTO itself, or even that institution more generally, there were several polls which shed light on Brazilian voters’ evaluation of global governance and the principles represented by the WTO more generally. For example, a survey by GlobeScan in January 2006 indicated 57% of respondents saw the free market system as the best basis for the global economy, compared to 30% who disagreed with this statement (3). Similarly, a GlobeScan poll from 2004 indicated 72% of Brazilian respondents evaluated globalization, defined as “increased trade between countries in goods, services and investment”, positively (5). Finally a BBC World Service Poll showed 77% of Brazilian respondents called for “fundamental reform” of global economic

---

7 Although this survey occurred after the mini-ministerial, the definition of ideas employed here, which emphasizes path dependency, suggests that, even if the exact value presented here was not identical to the value existing at the time of the meeting, the difference between the two values is unlikely to be significant.
governance (2009, 5), suggesting at least a level of commitment to these institutions high enough to warrant the effort necessary to reform them. In sum, the data suggests, like the Indian case study though less strongly, that not power-based autonomy but its opposite, institutional affiliation is the relevant idea of interest among Brazilian voters.

As for the Brazilian government, discourse featured two of the three ideas traced here, namely the power-based idea of influence and the idea of development. No statements featuring autonomy from the WTO were found in the analysis. The statements featuring influence emphasize equal participation in global governance decision-making as well as the importance of incorporating all countries’ views in global governance decisions. In other words, like the Indian government’s statements, they are characterized by the presence of calls for increased indirect influence. For example, President Lula explained the behavior of US and EU negotiators in previous WTO negotiations and his expectations for their behavior in Geneva so:

The negotiators are “used to a time when they didn’t have to negotiate. They imposed what they wanted and the others were forced to accept. Today, they have to take into account the existence of emerging countries” (No WTO Deal Unless US, EU Make More Concessions: Lula 2008).

The presence of such ideas correspond to the implicit argument in terms like “emerging power” that these states want to play a more active role on the global stage and gain more control over global governance as it affects their states. However, the relative unimportance of such ideas within official discourse – appearing in only 15 of the total 131 statements reviewed - warns against reading too much into this. Statements evidencing the idea of development underlined the large disparities between developed and developing countries, as well as the role emerging powers should play in narrowing this gap. For example, Minister Amorim noted after the negotiations:

“The agricultural issue was very important for developing countries like Brazil, which are major agricultural exporters, as well as for poor countries, which currently are not major exporters, but could be if they were able to avoid facing the subsidies rich countries” (MRE 2008).

Thus it appears, where ideas were concerned, the Brazilian government, like the Indian government, was highly responsive to public pressure. Unlike the Indian case, however, both power-based ideas and the control idea of development appeared to have an impact on both the direction and the weight of the relative variables within policy positions chosen by the government. The broad support for
influence and development amongst Brazilian voters is reflected in a significant presence of both variables in government positions before, during and after the mini-ministerial.

As to distribution of the variables within government commentary, Brazilian government statements were dominated by the presence of economic interest as opposed to power-based ideas. Whereas economic interests appeared in 41.2% of the statements reviewed, power-based ideas were present in only 11.5%. The control idea of development appears in 17.6%, or roughly half as often as the economic interests reviewed. In other words, although the discourse analysis of government commentary provides some support for the assumption of the “Power-hungry EPs,” again the “Pragmatic EP” appears to prevail, with economic interests present roughly four times as often as power-based ideas. This suggests that, even if power-based or geopolitical motivations stand behind Brazilian trade policy positions, voter legitimation of such policies can still only be obtained by emphasizing the economic sense (even when there is none) and consequences of trade policy decisions. Table 4 below summarizes the results of the discourse analysis.

Table 4: BRAZIL: WTO Mini-Ministerial Negotiations, Geneva, July 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statements % of Total</td>
<td>Statements % of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interest</td>
<td>52 65.0</td>
<td>54 41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>43 53.8</td>
<td>45 34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>4 5.0</td>
<td>3 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>5 6.3</td>
<td>7 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Based Ideas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15 11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>15 11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ideas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>23 17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable</td>
<td>28 35.0</td>
<td>38 29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commentary on Negotiations</td>
<td>22 27.5</td>
<td>37 28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement Totals</td>
<td>80 100</td>
<td>131 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, this case study also provides relatively clear answers to the two questions explored in this paper. Regarding policy motivation, Brazilian government discourse shows the dominance of economic interests over power-based ideas in the policymaking situation. It should be noted, however, that the combination of the two types of ideas traced – present in 29.1% of the statements as opposed to interests in 41.2% – affirms the importance of ideas generally in directing Brazilian trade policy. Regarding the responsiveness of the Brazilian government to domestic pressure, the results appear to be slightly different from the Indian case. Like the Indian case, the
economic interests important to industry groups did not appear in government statements to the same extent that they were present in industry statements, though the relative structure of interests (with liberalization leading, followed by cooperation and then protection) remained the same. This suggests interests helped determine both the direction and weight of Brazilian trade policy positions. However, unlike the Indian case, ideas in this case study appeared to do this as well, regardless of type: both control and power-based ideas with broad popular support demonstrated a significant presence in government positions and did so in a way which could be expected from analyzing public opinion polls. This raises doubts about the intermediary hypothesis raised in the Indian case study about EP governments bending to ideational pressure only when the ideas expressed fall outside their traditional policy reserve. Clearly more research is needed to determine whether and, if so, which commonalities exist regarding how EP governments decide to what extent societal ideas appear in policy positions.

**Conclusion**

This paper has attempted to answer two related questions regarding foreign economic policymaking in emerging power states. First, what informs the policy decisions of EP states? And, second, how responsive are EP governments to organized interests within their borders? Two types of EPs were presented. The Power-hungry EP makes foreign policy decisions – economic or not – in order to increase the influence of the state in the international arena, maintain its autonomy to pursue its goals as it chooses, or both. The Pragmatic EP’s foreign policy decisions are focused on providing tangible economic gains to the country and its businesses, and consequently reflect a minimal role for power-based ideas unless these advance the specific economic interest under consideration. A combination of discourse analysis with the analysis of relevant public opinion polls traced the presence of two independent variables, economic interests versus power-based ideas, and a control variable, the idea of development, to build a correlation between these variables and the dependent variable of the positions taken by the Brazilian and Indian negotiating teams in Geneva. This analysis thus is a first attempt to discover the balance of these two EP “personalities” in their foreign economic policy.

In answer to the first question, the answer appears to be, at least for India and Brazil, both economic interests and ideas, power-based and non-power-based. In both cases, and in contrast to a large section of the existent literature, power
motivations played little role in determining government positions regarding the trade negotiations in Geneva. Interestingly, the analysis indicated that, when power was present in government discourse, it was present almost exclusively as indirect influence. This suggests that institutional affiliation may be an important determinant in EPs’ policymaking vis-à-vis international economic organizations. This variable could be included in future research in an attempt to explain the statements which could not be classified according to the variables employed here. Further, the two case studies differed in the ability of ideas to affect the direction and relative weight of policy positions. More research is needed to explore the commonalities and differences in the behavior of domestic ideas within different EPs in order to determine whether this difference is simply an anomaly related to these EPs in this case, or whether it is a relevant characteristic that could illuminate the foreign policy decisions of these states more generally.

The importance of economic interests and the idea of development in EP foreign economic policy decisions as evidenced in the case studies is undeniable. This suggests that EPs will do whatever necessary to improve their economic position – including creating their own institutional options via, for example, preferential trade agreements. As Brazilian Minister Amorim noted following the failure in Geneva, “The WTO was a priority, because it is only here that we could address subsidies. But now we are going to have to concentrate on things that bring results. I cannot be left hanging for another four years” (Chade 2008). The prioritization of multilateral institutions and its rules by EP states thus depends on these institutions’ effectiveness in fulfilling their purposes and on these purposes aligning with the preferences generated within these states. These findings are, therefore, relevant not just to scholars of the EPs, but, rather, also to those interested in the future of the global governance system created and prolonged by traditional powers like the US and the European Union. The analysis thus reaffirms the importance, noted already by several others (Schirm 2009a; Dieter 2009; Drezner 2007; Ikenberry 2008; among others), of integrating these states into positions of power within these organizations, as has begun to happen via the inclusion of Brazil, India and China in small group negotiations in the WTO or via the quota increases for these countries in the IMF. Only by incorporating their views and goals into these institutions can the institutions’ legitimacy and EP participation be ensured in the long-run. In sum, then, the case studies suggest that both India and Brazil are
overwhelmingly Pragmatic EPs. Their Power-hungry personalities are certainly present but appear to be strategically governed and directed toward fulfillment of specific economic policy goals.

In answer to the second question, the results suggest a relatively high degree of government responsiveness to domestic pressure. In both case studies, there was a high correlation between both the ideas and interests expressed by interest groups and general voters and the position taken by the government during the negotiations. These results thus reinforce the literature which argues EP governments are increasingly responsive to domestic pressure. The difference between the two case studies regarding how the government responded to power-based ideas versus the control idea of development, however, suggests perhaps other factors should be explored in future research to determine whether different types of ideas impact policy positions in different ways and, if so, how they do so.

Finally, what about potential commonalities between Brazil and India – two EP states with obviously opposing interests in trade but which are nonetheless often grouped together in analyses and, recently, in real life as well? Although the economic interests pursued differed, the positions of both states indicated both tend to be Pragmatic EPs in their trade policy, actively engaging in pursuit of these goals. Further, the positions taken in both states appear to be heavily influenced by the interests and ideas of domestic actors. Though this provides preliminary support for “emerging powers” as an analytical concept, similar investigations in more dissimilar EP states, like China, Indonesia, or Mexico, could provide more insight by testing whether the commonalities which this analysis suggests justify the category itself hold over a variety of domestic political systems, geopolitical situations, and various forms of development. There is still much knowledge to emerge about the so-called emerging powers.
Appendix I: Variable indicators used in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ECONOMIC INTERESTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a desire for interstate cooperation in the field of trade; Words and phrases underlining the benefits of said cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating actions related to increasing market access/trade partners; Words and phrases underlining the benefits resulting from exports and/or imports; Words and phrases highlighting the negative consequences of closing and/or keeping markets closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating actions related to minimizing the negative consequences of free(r) trade; Words or phrases indicating the negative consequences of free(r) trade themselves; Words and phrases indicating a desire to close or keep markets closed; Words and phrases underlining the benefits of closing or keeping markets closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a lack of support for the multilateral trading system or the principles underlying it; Words and phrases indicating displeasure with the restrictions of said system or pleasure in unrestricted action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Words and phrases indicating a wish for more control over occurrences within the WTO or a desire to increase the ability of states to participate within it; Words and phrases delineating the responsibilities of various actors within the WTO; Words and phrases indicating a desire to or increase one’s ability to shape WTO rules or affect outcomes within it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Words or phrases indicating a wish to support development in less privileged countries through a certain policy; Words or phrases indicating a need for special policies to ensure such development or to facilitate equal participation of developing countries internationally; Words and phrases indicating the importance of development within the multilateral trading system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix II: Industry associations examined by industry

#### BRAZIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Industry Association(s) Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brazil (Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária, CNA); Brazilian Association of Seed Producers (Abrasem); Brazilian Agribusiness Association (Associação Brasileira de Agribusiness, ABAG); Institute for Responsible Agribusiness (Instituto para o Agronegócio Responsável, ARES); Permanent Forum on International Agricultural Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile and Automobile Parts</td>
<td>National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores, ANFAVEA); Brazilian Association of Auto Parts Manufacturers (Sindicato Nacional da Indústria de Componentes para Veículos Automotores, Sindipeças)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>Brazilian Association of Electric &amp; Electronic Industry (Associação Brasileira da Indústria Elétrica e Eletrônica, ABINEE); Association of Brazilian Companies of Software and Information Services (Assespro Nacional, ASSESPRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethanol</td>
<td>Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar, UNICA); Brazilian Power Research Company (EPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>Brazilian Poultry Producers and Exporters or Brazilian Chicken Producers and Exporters Association (ABEF); National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brazil (Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária, CNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar and Sugarcane</td>
<td>Sugarcane Growers Association of the Center South Region of Brazil (Organização dos Plantadores de Cana da Região Centro-Sul do Brasil, ORPLANA); Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Industry Association(s) Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>All India Agricultural Labour Association; Farmer Entrepreneurs Association; Shetkari Sanghtana; Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKI); Seed Association of India; Confederation of Indian Farmers Associations; Federation of Farmers’ Associations; Indian Coordination Committee of Farmers; Bharatiya Krishak Samaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile and Automobile Parts</td>
<td>The Society of Indian Auto Manufacturers (SIAM); Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations; Automotive Component Manufacturers Association (ACMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gems and Jewelry</td>
<td>All India Gems and Jewellery Trade Federation; Gems and Jewellery Export Promotion Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT-BPO Services</td>
<td>Manufacturers’ Association for Information Technology; National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Garments</td>
<td>Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI); Southern Indian Mills’ Association (SIMA); Textile Association (India); Clothing Manufacturers’ Association of India; Northern India Textile Mills Association (NITMA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Works Cited


Dhar, Biswajit and Abhik Majumdar. 2006 (Jan.). The India-EC GSP Dispute: The Issues and the Process. Working paper commissioned by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Studies (ICSTD) as part of ICSTD’s Asia Dialogue on WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development.


&pnt=154&nid=&id.

&pnt=90&nid=&id.


